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ADEA Front Pay Awards: 
Who Should Determine the Amount? 
In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Em- 
ployment Act (ADEA).' The purposes of the ADEA are "to pro- 
mote employment of older persons based on their ability rather 
than age; [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in em- 
ployment.'" These purposes are achieved through ADEA provi- 
sions which make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his or her employment based on the individual's 
age.3 
The ADEA states that its remedial provisions are enforce- 
able through either governmental intervention4 or a civil ac- 
tion by any aggrieved p e r ~ o n . ~  In a civil action under the 
ADEA, "any court of competent jurisdiction" is authorized to 
render "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the pur- 
poses of this ~hapter ."~ Among the relief granted by courts to 
ADEA plaintiffs is that of "front pay." Front pay is the present 
value of future income that  an  improperly discharged employee 
would have earned if she were to continue working for her 
employer for the balance of her working life.? 
The ADEA does not, however, specifically provide for the 
award of front pay to age discrimination victims,8 and many 
courts rebuffed early attempts by plaintiffs to obtain front pay 
awards under the ADEA.' Nevertheless, every federal circuit 
1. 29 U.S.C. 621-634 (1988). 
2. Id. § 62103). 
3. Id. $ 623(a). 
4. Id. § 62603). 
5. Id. 626(c)(l). 
6. Id. 
7. Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1990). 
8. See generally Anthony F .  Cottone, Comment, Settling the Front Pay Contro- 
versy Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Whittlesey v. Union Car- 
bide Corp., 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 122 (1984) (discussing whether front pay is an 
appropriate remedy under the ADEA). 
9. See, e.g., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1982) (front 
pay awards not available in age discrimination suit); Price v. Maryland Casualty 
c0.7 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 19751, affd, 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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court that has considered the issue now holds that front pay is 
a remedy available to plaintiffs in ADEA suits.'' The issue 
currently facing the various circuits is whether the amount of a 
front pay award should be determined by juries or by judges." 
The circuits are clearly divided on this issue.12 
This comment examines the nature of front pay awards in 
ADEA proceedings. Part I1 sets forth the background leading 
up to the present split among the circuits regarding the deter- 
mination of the amount of a front pay award. Part I11 summa- 
rizes the present case law in support of allowing juries to deter- 
mine the amount of front pay to award in ADEA suits. Part IV 
examines the reasoning of those courts which hold that the 
amount of front pay should be determined by judges rather 
than juries. Part V analyzes the jury trial provisions of the 
Seventh Amendment and of Supreme Court case law. Part V 
concludes that juries, rather than judges, should be permitted 
to determine the amount of front pay in ADEA actions. 
The remedial provisions- of the ADEA13 do not provide ex- 
plicitly for front pay as a remedy in age discrimination suits. 
Instead, the granting of fkont pay arises from the notion that 
courts should seek "to make persons whole for injuries suffered 
on account of unlawful employment di~crimination."'~ 
10. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985); 
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Maxfield v. 
Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 
(1986); Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 429 (1991); Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 
F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 
118 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber 
Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 
F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US. 859 (1982); EEOC v. Prudential 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
946 (1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 US. 1005 (1985). 
11. See generally Richard J. Seryak, Front-Pay Awards in Employment Litiga- 
tion: An Issue for the Judge or Jury? 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 131 (1991) (pointing 
out split in circuits concerning whether judges or juries should determine amount 
of ADEA front pay awards). 
12. Id. 
13. 29 U.S.C. 8 626 (1988). 
14. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (emphasis added). 
ADEA FRONT PAY AWARDS 
A. "Make Whole" Standard of Relief 
The "make whole" standard of relief is conside 
touchstone for courts in fashioning both legal and equitable 
remedies in employment discrimination actions."15 Courts are 
encouraged to use the ADEA's broad grant of remedial authori- 
ty to re-create the circumstances which would have existed, or 
rather persisted, but for the unlawful discrimination.16 To 
that end, courts routinely award back pay to victims of age dis- 
crimination for damages they have suffered up to the time of 
judgment." However, back pay does not make a n  injured par- 
ty whole for damages suffered, or which will be suffered, after 
the time of judgment. Therefore, another remedy is required to 
compensate an age discrimination victim for damages during 
the gap between the final judgment and the time the employee 
returns to gainful employment. In fact, the gap may extend 
until the employee would have retired. Reinstatement of the 
employee is a remedy which can fill that gap. 
B. Reinstatement as a Remedy for Prospective Damages 
The ADEA explicitly provides for the equitable remedy of 
reinstatement of an employee to his former position with the 
employer when the employee is wrongfully discharged on the 
basis of age.'' Naturally, reinstating an  employee to his for- 
mer position makes him "whole" by returning him to the same 
economic position he occupied before being wrongfully dis- 
charged. The federal circuits agree with this proposition and 
uniformly hold that reinstatement is the preferred form of 
relief for prospective damages ADEA plaintiffs may suffer.lg 
15. Bridget Flanagan, Comment, Front Pay as a Remedy Under the Age Dis- 
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 187 n.1 (1985) (citing 
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976) (Title VII standard)). 
"Victims of unlawful labor practices are entitled to be restored to the economic 
position they would have occupied but for the intervening illegal conduct of an 
employer." Id. 
16. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982). 
17. Flanagan, supra note 15, at  187. 
18. "In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdic- 
tion to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employ- 
ment, reinstatement or promotion . . . ." 29 U.S.C. $ 626(b) (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
19. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990) (" 'Reinstate- 
ment is generally the preferred remedy for a discriminatory discharge.' ") (quoting 
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Reinstatement, however, is not possible in all cases. Courts 
have recognized several circumstances under which reinstate- 
ment of an  age discrimination victim would be impossible or 
undesirable. For example, requiring reinstatement of an  em- ' 
ployee may be undesirable if the relationship between the em- 
ployer and the employee has become so hostile and antagonistic 
as to be neither beneficial nor produ~tive.'~ Furthermore, the 
employee's former position of employment may have been filled 
by another employee who is innocent of any wrongdoing; dis- 
placing the innocent employee simply perpetuates an injus- 
t i ~ e . ~ '  Finally, reinstatement is not possible when a company 
is no longer in business or has ceased to operate that portion of 
its enterprise for which the wrongfully discharged employee 
was qualified.22 
C. Front Pay as an Alternative Remedy 
If reinstatement of the employee is not feasible, an alterna- 
tive remedy must be found to fill the gap in the damage award 
for injury suffered between judgment and the employee's retire- 
ment. Front pay is such an alternati~e. '~ In fact, front pay is 
Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989)); accord EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
763 F.2d 1166, 1171-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) ("[Rleinstat- 
ement is the preferred remedy under the ADEA and should be ordered whenever i t  
is appropriate."); Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 
111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Blim v. Western Elec. 
Co., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984). 
20. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 
1984) (employer-employee relationship may be "irreparably damaged by animosity 
associated with the litigation"). 
21. See, e.g., Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 120-22 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(reversing supplemental order requiring employer to reinstate aggrieved employee 
to position already filled by another employee); cf. Patterson v. American Tobacco 
Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (involving 
displacement of an employee in a racial discrimination case). 
22. Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 732 F. Supp. 605, 609 @. Md. 1990). 
An employee's health has also been cited as a si@cant factor in denying an age 
discrimination victim's request for reinstatement. See, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858, 865-67 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of reinstate- 
ment of test pilot due to expert testimony that he was unable to safely perform 
the job). 
23. See, e.g., Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469-70 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989) ("district court's award of front pay in 
this case was improper without a precedent finding that reinstatement was not 
feasible"); Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales Inc., 789 F.2d 253, 261 (3d 
Cir. 1986) ("[Wlhen circumstances prevent reinstatement, front pay may be an 
ADEA FRONT PAY AWARDS 
said to be given in lieu of r e i n ~ t a t e m e n t ~ ~  so that the "make 
whole" objective of the ADEA's remedial provisions is not frus- 
trated.25 
The federal circuits agree that the decision to grant or to 
deny the remedy of reinstatement of an employee wrongfully 
discharged on the basis of age rests with the judge? Such a 
alternative remedy.") (citing Maxfield v. Sinclair Intl, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986)); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 
F.2d 1435, 1448-49 ( l l th  Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985) ("[Aln award of 
front pay-ie., prospective lost earnings-may be an appropriate remedy in an age 
discrimination suit because reinstatement would be impracticable or inadequate."); 
Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 732 F. Supp. 605, 609 (D. Md. 1990) ('When 
reinstatement is inappropriate, the Court can consider front pay as an alterna- 
tive."); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1990), reu'd on 
other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The alternative remedies of reinstate- 
ment or front pay are available in the event that some further award is necessary 
to make the plaintiff whole."). 
24. Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., 940 F.2d 1429, 1438 ( l l t h  Cir. 1991) 
("prospective damages are awarded in lieu of reinstatement" when reinstatement is 
not feasible); Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 
1988) (front pay available "in lieu of reinstatement"). 
Note that a refusal by an ADEA plaintiff to accept reinstatement as a remedy 
will not necessarily be fatal to his or her claim for front pay. If the ADEA plaintiff 
"has reasonably rehsed reinstatement, frontpay [sic] is an available remedy under 
the ADEA." O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 
( l l t h  Cir. 1984); accord Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1203 
(7th Cir. 1989); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th 
Cir. 1988); Lemons v. ICM Mortgage Corp., No. 90-1211, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
19754, at *7 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1991) (unpublished opinion). 
Furthermore, a failure by an ADEA plaintiff to include in his or her pleadings 
a request for reinstatement or for front pay should not preclude a court from 
granting either. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 638 (10th Cir. 
1988). "The trial court 'shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor [a 
final judgment] is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in the party's pleadings.' " Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c)). 
A few courts hold an opposite, although incorrect, view. " '[Flront pay' . . . 
c a ~ o t  be awarded where no claim is made in the litigation for . . . reinstate- 
ment." Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (D. Me. 1986); 
see also Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980). 
25. Reneau v. Wayne Griffm & Sons, Inc., 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991) 
("Since reinstatement may not be feasible, front pay may make the plaintiff 
whole . . . ."); McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (indicating that when reinstatement is infeasible 
or inappropriate, front pay may be awarded to make the plaintiff whole). 
26. See Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 429 (1991); Burns v. Texas City Ref., Inc., 890 F.2d 747, 753 (5th Cir. 
1990); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 1989!, cert. denied, 493 
US.  1062 (1990); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 
1988); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 ( l l t h  Cir. 1988); Fite 
v. First T ~ M .  Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 892 (6th Cir. 1988); Dominic v. 
Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987); Cassino v. Reichhold 
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decision is an exercise of the judge's equitable powers.27 Be- 
cause front pay is given in lieu of reinstatemenean equitable 
remedy-it follows that the judge should decide whether an  
award of front pay is warrantedz8 since the judge must deter- 
mine that reinstatement is not feasible and that the employee 
would be left less than "whole." Although the circuits concur 
that  a judge should decide whether to grant an award of front 
pay, they are split on whether the jury or the judge should de- 
termine the amount of front pay to award." 
111. ALLOWING JURIES TO DETERMINE 
THE AMOUNT OF FRONT PAY TO AWARD 
A. Federal Circuits That Permit Juries to Determine 
the Amount of Front Pay 
Many of the federal circuits have struggled in deciding 
whether judges or juries should determine the amount of front 
pay to award in ADEA actions. Case law from seven circuits 
has indicated that juries should set the amount. However, only 
three of those circuits still clearly adhere to this rule, three 
circuits have rejected the rule, and one circuit has vacillated. 
The Third," Sixth:' and Ninths2 Circuits have held 
that  juries should set the amount of front pay awards in ADEA 
actions. At one time, courts in the Fifth,33 Seventh:* and 
Chem. Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 
771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985). 
27. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n.11 (1978) (judgment compelling rein- 
statement is clearly equitable). 
28. See, e.g., Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1990); 
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984). 
29. See generally Seryak, supra note 11, at  134-35. 
30. See, e.g., Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(affirming jury award of front pay). 
31. See, e.g., Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 
1988). 
32. See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 
1987) (implicitly approving delegation of determination of amount of front pay to 
jury but reversing the trial court due to a flawed jury instruction). 
33. The Fifth Circuit originally held in Hansard u. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling 
Co., that "[ilf the trial court concludes that front pay is appropriate, then the jury 
should determine the amount of damages." 865 F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989). 
34. The Seventh Circuit determined that "[aluthority and reason both suggest 
that while the decision to award front pay is within the discretion of the trial 
court, the amount of damages available is a jury question." Coston v. Plitt 
Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1333 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987), (dicta) (citing Mafield v. 
Sinelair Intl,  766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); 
ADEA FRONT PAY AWARDS 
~ e n t h ~ '  Circuits held that juries should determine the amount 
of front pay; they have since repudiated that view,36 indicat- 
ing a clear trend away from allowing juries to determine the 
amount of front pay to  award ADEA claimants. 
Case law in the First Circuit suggests that juries should 
set the amount of front pay. However, that case law has been 
unsettled, even schizophrenic. The First Circuit initially held 
that front pay was not an allowable remedy in an ADEA 
suit;37 however, the court later reversed that position, ruling 
that front pay was available in lieu of rein~tatement.~' In its 
first decision upholding an award of front pay to an ADEA 
plaintiff, the First Circuit hinted, in dictum, that the amount of 
front pay should be set by a judge.39 But the First Circuit ap- 
see also Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1318 (N.D. 111. 1990) (district 
court in 7th Circuit) ("[Elven though front pay is an alternative remedy to rein- 
statement, it is a legal remedy, not an equitable one."). 
35. A district court in the Tenth Circuit held that "although the court deter- 
mines whether to award front pay, the jury properly decides upon the amount of 
front pay in the event that the court ultimately frnds such damages recoverable." 
Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys., 660 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D. Kan. 1987). 
36. The Fifth Circuit reversed itself in 1990, holding that "[als an equitable 
remedy under federal law, we believe that it was within the district court's discre- 
tion to determine the amount of the front pay award." Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc,, 
897 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir. 1990). 
The Seventh Circuit decided in Graefenhuin v. Pabst Brewing Co. that front 
pay is an equitable remedy. 870 F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming district 
court's award of front pay); see also Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055- 
57 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing and remanding court's award of front pay for being 
too speculative but permitting court to make determination of amount of front 
pay). 
The Tenth Circuit decided in Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co. that a judge 
should set the amount of front pay. 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991). The court 
held: 
Because the cases holding that the calculation of front pay is a jury ques- 
tion do so primarily by adhering,to earlier precedent assuming this was 
the jury's function, we will follow the more reasoned line of authority . . . 
which considers in detail the legislative history of the ADEA, the nature 
of the remedies it provides, and the traditional function of the court and 
jury. 
Id. at 1426. 
37. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1982). 
38. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985). 
39. Id. "Future damages should not be awarded unless reinstatement is imprac- 
ticable or impossible; the district court, then, hus discretion to award front pay. 
Because future damages are often speculative, the district court, in exercising its 
discretion, should consider the circumstances of the case, including the availability 
of liquidated damages." Id. (emphasis added). At least one commentator believed 
that the First Circuit would allow the amount of ADEA front pay awards to be 
determined by judges rather than juries. Seryak, supra note 11, at  138 n.15. The 
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parently reversed its position on this point by upholding a 1989 
decision in which the district court permitted a jury to deter- 
mine the amount of front pay.40 In upholding the decision, the 
First Circuit remanded the case for a new calculation of the 
amount of front pay that should be awarded!' The court, 
however, did not explicitly decide whether the jury should set 
the amount of front payp2 it merely remanded the case for a 
more appropriate calculation of da1nages.4~ It would appear, 
although not conclusively, that the First Circuit regards the 
determination of the amount of front pay in ADEA actions as a 
matter within the jury's discretion. 
B. Reasoning of Courts That Permit Juries to Determine 
the Amount of Front Pay 
The circuits holding that juries should determine the 
amount of front pay in ADEA suits have not offered any sub- 
stantial reasoning in support of such a holding. They merely 
assume that the responsibility of determining the amount of 
front pay is within the scope of the jury's duties. The explana- 
tion of the Third Circuit in Maxfield v. Sinclair Internation- 
ar4 is typical. Mafield, a salesman for Sinclair, was forced to 
retire one month after his sixty-fiffh birthday and was replaced 
by a younger empl~yee.~' The jury concluded that Sinclair's 
actions violated the ADEA? The court noted that reinstate- 
ment was the preferable remedy for the violation:' but said 
that front pay could be given in lieu of reinstatement since 
reinstatement was not feasible.48 The court then announced 
that "[olf course the amount of damages available as front pay 
is a jury que~tion.'"~ This is the court's reasoning, in its entire- 
ty. Other decisions by the Third,50 Sixth5' and Ninth52 Cir- 
reference to the district court's exercise of "discretion" indicated that the amount of 
front pay awarded would be set by juries in the First Circuit. Id. 
40. L ~ M  v. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
41. Id. at 8-9. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 9. 
44. 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
45. Id. at 790-91. 
46. Id. at 790-92. 
47. Id. at 796. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 n.11 (3d Cir. 
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cuits are equally unenlightening. In short, none of the circuits 
that permit juries to  set the amount of front pay in ADEA 
actions provide any analysis that can be examined for 
soundness. 
IV. ALLOWING JUDGES TO DETERMINE 
THE AMOUNT OF FRONT PAY TO AWARD 
A. Federal Circuits That Permit Judges to Determine 
the Amount of Front Pay 
In contrast to the cases allowing juries to determine the 
amount of front pay awards in ADEA suits, courts in six feder- 
al circuits have held-and continue to hold-that such awards 
should be set by the trial judge.53 These include the Courts of 
Appeals for the Second,54 Fourth,S5 ' Seventh,S6 EighthP7 
Tenth," and Eleventh5' Circuits. 
1989) ("The determination of the amount of front pay necessarily involves some 
imprecision. However, to permit the jury to undertake that calculation is not 
reversible error . . . ."); Anastasia v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 704-05 (3d Cir. 
1988) (affirming jury award of front pay); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 
367, 374 (3d Cir. 1987). 
51. See, e.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) 
("[Tlhis Court now holds that the approval of the prospective damage award of 
$88,800 as returned by the jury was not an abuse of discretion."); Fite v. First 
Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 1988) (relying on Davis to 
allow jury to determine amount of front pay award). 
52. See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 
1987) (permitting jury to establish amount of front pay). 
53. In addition, one circuit has reached the same result in a case involving 
Louisiana's version of the ADEA. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 824 
(5th Cir. 1990) (determination of amount of front pay award within district court's 
discretion). 
54. Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987). 
55. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F,2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 429 (1991) ("[Ilts award [front pay] and amount is one for the court sitting in 
equity to consider and not the jury."). 
56. See, e.g., Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing 
and remanding district court's award of front pay as too speculative but permitting 
trial court to set the amount of front pay); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 
F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1989) (remanding case for reconsideration of events occurring 
after trial but permitting trial court to  set the amount of front pay): 
57. See, e.g., MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 
1988) (affirming trial court's determination of amount of front pay); Brooks v. 
Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court's 
determination of amount of front pay). 
58. Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991) 
("follow[ing] the more reasoned line of authority" that judges should set the 
amount of front pay awards in ADEA actions). 
59. See, e.g., Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., 940 F.2d 1429, 1438 n.20 (11th 
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B. Reasoning of Courts That Permit Judges to Determine 
the Amount of Front Pay 
1. The leading case: Dominic 
Dominic u. Consolidated Edison CO.,~' decided by the Sec- 
ond Circuit, is the leading case holding that a determination of 
the amount of front pay in ADEA suits is an issue for the 
judge? Dominic, the plaintiff, was fired by Consolidated Edi- 
son in violation of the ADEA.62 The trial court decided that re- 
instatement was not an appropriate remedy in the case.63 In- 
stead, the court held that Dominic was entitled to front pay.64 
The jury awarded the plaintiff $378,000 in front pay. The trial 
judge, however, concluded that the determination of the 
amount of front pay was within the court's discretion rather 
than the Dominic asserted on appeal that the amount 
of front pay was a factual issue to  be decided by the jury? 
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the determination 
of the amount of front pay is properly made by the judge? 
The Dominic court found support in the ADEA's statutory 
language and legislative history for its conclusion that judges 
should determine the amount of front pay awards in ADEA 
The court identified two types of relief provided for in 
the statute." The first type of relief is that of "amounts ow- 
ing," which includes "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over- 
time c~mpensation."~' The second type of relief consists of 
Cir. 1991) (district court did not err in failing to instruct jury on determination of 
amount of front pay; "[Iince reinstatement and prospective damages are equitable 
in nature, the court had no obligation to instruct the jury on these remedies"); 
Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988) (case re- 
manded to district court for judge to reconsider amount of front pay awarded); 
Spivak v. Coulter Elec., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating in 
dictum that the amount of front pay would be within the judge's equitable discre- 
tion). 
60. 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987). 
61. Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991). 
62. Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1253. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1253-54. 
66. Id. at 1257. 
67. Id. at 1258. 
68. Id. at 1256-57. 
69. Id. at 1257. 
70. 29 U.S.C. 5 626(b) (1982). The remedial provisions of the ADEA are as 
follows: 
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"such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effec- 
tuate the purposes of [the ADEA]" including reinstatement.?' 
The statute provides for "a trial by jury of any issue of fact 
in any such action for recovery of amounts owing . . . regardless 
of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such ac- 
t i~n."?~ The statute is silent, however, with respect to a jury 
trial when courts consider granting other "legal or  equitable 
relief." According t o  the Dominic court, this indicates that 
"facts relevant to a plaintiffs legal recovery, [i.e.] 'amounts 
owing,' are to be tried by a jury even if equitable relief is also 
sought, but that issues concerning equitable relief are not to be 
tried by a jury."73 The court explained that the language of 
the statute demonstrates Congress's intent to maintain the 
Seventh Amendment's distinction between legal and equitable 
claims which provide the framework for the duties of the judge 
and the 
Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall 
be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensa- 
tion for purposes of sections 16 and 17 of this title: Provided, That liqui- 
dated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this 
chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall 
have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appro- 
priate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limita- 
tion judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 8 626(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
73. Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257. In adopting this interpretation, the court re- 
jected the alternative "interpretation that whenever some legal relief is sought, all 
factual issues in the action are to be tried by a jury." Id. 
74. Id. The court explained, see id., that the legislative history of the ADEA 
supports this interpretation: 
The House Conference Report (Report) indicates that the term "amounts 
owing-the first type of remedy-was understood to mean "items of pecuniary or 
economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits" and "liquidated 
damages." H.R. REP. NO. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.AN. 504, 528, 535. Note that these are damages which are retrospective 
in nature. Front pay, on the other hand, is a prospective remedy; accordingly, an 
award of front pay is not an "amount owing" for purposes of section 626(b). See 
Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1210 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Congress explicitly provided for a jury trial when dealing with "amounts owing" 
under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 8 626(c)(2) (1982), and the language of the Report indi- 
cates that members of the House Conference Committee understood the significance 
of providing for a jury trial: "Because liquidated damages are in the nature of 
legal relief, it is manifest that a party is entitled to have the factual issues under- 
lying such a claim decided by a jury." H.R. REP. NO. 950, at  13-14 (emphasis 
added). The Report, as well as the ADEA itself, is silent with respect to jury trials 
regarding the second type of relief-"such legal and equitable relief as  may be 
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The court further asserted that this is a "common sense 
result," since there is a good deal of overlap between the facts 
relevant to deciding whether to award front pay and the facts 
relevant t o  deciding the amount of front pay to  award.75 The 
court reasoned that dividing the fact-finding duties could lead 
t o  inconsistent decisions by the judge and the There- 
fore, the court concludes, the determination of the amount of 
front pay is a matter within the trial judge's equitable discre- 
tion.?? 
2. A problem with the reasoning in Dominic: No resolution of 
the legal versus equitable dichotomy 
The issue of who should make the determination of the 
amount of front pay turns on whether front pay is legal or 
equitable in nature. If it is "equitable," it is an issue for the 
judge;?' if it is 'legal," it is for the jury.?' The Dominic court 
never reaches the question of whether front pay is a legal or 
equitable issue. Instead, it simply assumes that it is equitable. 
This assumption is manifest in the court's analysis, which 
focuses on "amounts o~ing."'~ 
The court notes that the statute provides for a jury trial on 
the facts relevant t o  a plaintiffs recovery of "amounts ow- 
ing."' This, the court states, is evidence of Congress's intent 
appropriate." 
A fair reading of the ADEA and of the accompanying legislative history in- 
'dicates that Congress intended "to comply with the seventh amendment by pro- 
viding for a jury trial of factual issues underlying [ADEA] claims." Dominic, 822 
F.2d at 1257. In addition, there is no evidence that Congress intended to provide 
for a jury trial for equitable relief under the ADEA. Id. Instead, it appears that 
Congress intended to maintain "the traditional distinction between legal and 
equitable claims embodied in the seventh amendment." Id. This conclusion is 
buttressed by Congress's insistence on the availability of "a trial by jury for any 
issue of fact in . . . an action for amounts owing . . . regardless of whether equita- 
ble relief is sought by any party in such action." 29 U.S.C. 626(c)(2) (1982) 
(emphasis added). Congress's insistence that a jury trial be available despite the 
possibility that a court might face equitable issues in an ADEA case indicates 
Congress's understanding of the legal versus equitable dichotomy. Dominic, 822 
F.2d at 1257. 
75. Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1258. 
78. Cf.  K e ~ e t h  Vinson, Artificial World of Law and Fact, 11 LEGAL STUD. F. 
311 (1987) (discussing the classification of remedies as either legal or equitable). 
79. Id. 
80. Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257-58. 
81. Id. at 1257. 
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to provide a jury trial in keeping with the requirements of the Sev- 
enth Amendment.82 From there, the court jumps to an expla- 
nation of how requiring judges to  decide whether t o  permit 
front pay and allowing juries to determine the amount of front 
pay divides the fact-finding dutied3 Finally, the court con- 
cludes that front pay is an equitable remedy within the discre- 
tion of the judge.84 The court reaches this conclusion without 
squarely deciding whether front pay is legal or equitable in 
nature. Hence, the court never reaches the dispositive . 
issue-whether front pay is an equitable or legal remedy. 
C. An Attempt to Solve the Legal Versus Equitable 
Dichotomy: Duke v. Uniroyal 
1. The analysis in Duke v. Uniroyal 
The Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether front 
pay is a legal or equitable remedy in Duke v. U n i r ~ y a l . ~ ~  The 
court began by stating that the question of who should deter- 
mine the amount of front pay depends upon whether it is a 
legal or an equitable remedy? The Fourth Circuit, quoting 
from Curtis v. Loether, said that money damages were the 
traditional " 'form of relief offered in the courts of law."'87 
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that money dam- 
Id. 
Id. The court warns that splitting the fad-finding duties 
would be anomalous and would risk inconsistent decisions. A jury might 
conclude that the employee would never find other work and award a 
large sum in front pay, while the judge found that he or she would find 
work immediately and that no award was appropriate. Or, a judge might 
find front pay appropriate, but the jury might award only a nominal sum 
based on its belief that the employee could secure immediate employment. 
Id.; accord Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985). Contra Gibson 
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). 
The risk of inconsistent outcomes should not be sufficient, however, to overcome 
the traditional functions of judge and jury. " 'Maintenance of the jury as a fact- 
finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history that 
any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the 
utmost care.' " Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) 
(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). 
84. Dominic, 822 F.2d at  1258. 
85. 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991). The Fourth 
Circuit's decision in Duke v. Uniroyal is apparently the only federal circuit decision 
directly addressing the issue of whether front pay is a legal or equitable remedy. 
86. Id. at  1424. 
87. Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)). 
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ages are not always legal in nature. The court elaborated by 
quoting from Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, which holds 
that money damages may be a type of equitable relief if they 
are " 'restitutionary' or 'incidental to or intertwined with in- 
junctive relief.' "" And finally, the Fourth Circuit compared 
front pay under the ADEA to back pay under Title VII, which 
has been held to be equitable in nature.8g The court deter- 
mined that the two remedies were analogous since both have a 
"restitutionary nature."g0 Therefore, the court reasoned, front 
pay under the ADEA should be treated as an equitable 
remedy-the same as back pay under Title VILgl 
2. The flaws in the analysis of Duke-v. Uniroyal 
The analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Duke v. Uniroyal has 
three flaws: the suggestion that front pay is restitutionary, the 
analogy of ADEA front pay to Title VII back pay, and the prop- 
osition that front pay is "incidental to or intertwined with" 
equitable relief. 
a. First flaw: Front pay equated with "restitution." The 
first flaw, the assertion that front pay is restitutionary in na- 
ture," is based on a misuse of the term "restitution." The 
Supreme Court explained that "[rlestitution is limited t o  're- 
storing the status quo and ordering the return of that which 
rightfully belongs to [another].' "93 Likewise, restoring the sta- 
tus quo is the basis of the "make whole" standard of relief in 
employment discrimination actions.94 However, the status quo 
in the law of restitution and the status quo in an ADEA action 
are not the same thing. 
Restitution serves to return something to its rightful own- 
erY5 It prevents an unjust enrichment. "A person who has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to  
88. Id. (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71 
(1990)). Note that the quoted material attributed to Chauffeurs Local No. 391 is 
actually from Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987). 




93. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (quoting Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)). 
94. See discussion supra part IIA. 
95. State v. Barnett, 3 A.2d 521, 525-26 (Vt. 1939) (theft case). 
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make restitution to the ~ther ." '~  Restitution restores the sta- 
tus quo by returning a benefit,'? unjustly conferred upon an- 
other, to its rightful owner. For example, an action to compel 
the "disgorgement of improper profits" is restit~tionary.~' 
In  an ADEA action, the status quo is restored by returning 
an  aggrieved employee to the same economic position she 
would have occupied but for the wrongful discharge." This is 
accomplished by reinstating her to her former position of em- 
ployment or by granting her money damages, such as front 
pay.loO Consequently, the employee is restored to her rightful 
economic position. Her employer, however, was not unjustly 
enriched. Unjust enrichment occurs when one has retained 
money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to anoth- 
er.''' The employer does not "retain" something belonging to 
the employee. The employer, therefore, does not make restitu- 
tion t o  the employee when he is forced to reinstate the employ- 
ee or to pay her front pay due to the wrongful discharge. Thus, 
front pay is not equivalent to restitution and equating front 
pay to restitution in order to find that front pay is equitable in  
nature is improper. 
b. Second flaw: front pay analogous to back pay. The 
Fourth Circuit's second flaw in Duke v. U n i r ~ y a l ' ~ ~  was the 
analogy of ADEA front pay to Title VII back pay, which is an  
equitable remedy.lo3 The court believed the two types of 
awards were analogous for two reasons. The court's first reason 
is that back pay under Title VII is restitutionary in nature? 
As was explained above, front pay in ADEA actions is not 
96. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION $ 1 (1937). 
97. The Restatement of the Law of Restitution defrnes a "benefit" as follows: 
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other posses- 
sion of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in ac- 
tion, performs services beneficial to or at  the request of the other, sat- 
isfies a debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the other's 
security or advantage. 
Id. $ 1 cmt. b, at 12. 
98. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987). 
99. Flanagan, supra note 15, at 187. 
100. Id. at 207-08. 
101. Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ohio 1938); see also Conkling's 
Estate v. Champlin, 141 P.2d 569, 570 (Okla. 1943); Tulalip Shores, Inc. v. 
Mortland, 511 P.2d 1402, 1404 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). 
102. 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991). 
103. Id. at 1424. 
104. Id. 
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restitutionary in naturelo5 since it does not represent an 
employer's return to the employee of an unjust enrichment. 
Furthermore, back pay represents wages which the employee 
should have received and were, therefore, "due and owing." 
Front pay represents wages yet unearned and, necessarily, 
speculative in nature. 
The court's second reason for its analogy of ADEA front 
pay to Title VII back pay is that the decision whether to grant 
either of the awards is left to the decision of the trial court.lo6 
While this is true, i t  does not further the analysis of the nature 
of the front pay award. This is especially true since front pay is 
actually a secondary, or default, award. It is granted only if re- 
instatement of an employee is not feasible.''' Consequently, 
the judge does not really choose from among the many reme- 
dies available to her when determining whether to award front 
pay; instead, she is forced to consider it  when reinstatement, 
a n  equitable remedy, fails to fit the needs of the ADEA claim- 
ant. 
c. Third flaw: front pay "incidental to or intertwined with" 
equitable relief. The Fourth Circuit's third flaw in its analysis 
in  Duke u. U n i r ~ ~ a l ' ~ ~  arises from its assertion that an award 
of money damages-in this case an award of front pay-may be 
equitable in nature if it is "'incidental to or intertwined with 
injunctive relief.' "'Og This assertion has two problems. 
(1) Front pay is not %xidental to or intertwined with" 
equitable relief. Front pay in ADEA actions is not incidental to 
or intertwined with equitable relief. Instead, front pay is given 
in lieu of equitable relief (reinstatement) when the equitable 
relief is not an appropriate remedy.ll0 These two types of 
awards, front pay and reinstatement, are mutually exclusive, 
not intertwined remedies. Hence, front pay is not awarded 
when reinstatement of an  employee is feasible. 
(2) The clean-up doctrine. More problematic, however, 
is the Fourth Circuit's contention that the nature of money 
damages changes from "legal" to "equitable" when those money 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101. 
106. Duke v. Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1424. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25. 
108. 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991). 
109. Id. at 1424 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 
(1990)). Note that the quoted material attributed to Chauffeurs Local No. 391 is 
actually from Tu11 v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987). 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
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damages are granted " 'incidental to or intertwined with' " equi- 
table relief."' The result of this change in character is that a 
claimant may be denied his right to a jury trial since the reme- 
dy is characterized as equitable rather than legal in na- 
ture.l12 This problem is a manifestation of the "clean-up doc- 
trine." 
Prior t o  the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
dure in 1938,'l3 suits in equity and suits at law proceeded sepa- 
rately.l14 Claimants seeking both equitable and legal forms of 
relief from the same underlying facts usually had to  pursue an 
action in equity and another action at law.'l5 The clean-up 
doctrine allowed a court of equity to dispose of legal issues in 
cases having both legal and equitable issues. This occurred 
when an action was predominantly equitable in nature but also 
gave rise to some legal relief which was "incidental to the equi- 
table relief that the plaintiff s~ught.""~ In such cases, the 
courts of equity would dispose of both the equitable and legal 
issues. Consequently, claimants were denied the opportunity to 
have these legal issues decided by a jury. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the distinction 
between legal and equitable actions."' Instead, the Rules re- 
quire that all claims arising from a single set of circumstances 
be raised in a single pro~eeding."~ In addition, Rule 38(a) 
provides that "[tlhe right of trial. by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by statute 
of the United States shall be preserved to the parties invio- - 
late."llg The Rules, therefore, seemed to provide for a jury tri- 
al on all legal claims. In spite of the Rules' provision for jury 
trials, some confusion arose as to whether a jury trial was 
111. Duke v. Uniroyal, 928 F.2d at 1124 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. 
Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 (1990)). Note that the quoted material attributed to Chauf- 
feurs Local No. 391 is actually from Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 
(1987). 
Cf. Vinson, supra note 78, at 311-13. 
See FED. R. CW. P. 86(a). 
5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 38.03 (2d ed. 
Id. 
Id. 
See FED. R. CW. P. 2. 
See id.; FED. R. CW. P. 8. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a). 
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permitted in cases in which the clean-up doctrine was previ- 
ously applied. 120 
The Supreme Court addressed this confusion regarding the 
vitality of the "clean-up doctrine" in Beacon Theatres v. 
Westo~er.'~' There, the Court indicated that the right to a ju- 
ry trial 
"cannot be dispensed with, except by the assent of the parties 
entitled to it, nor can it be impaired by any blending with a 
claim, properly cognizable a t  law, of a demand for equitable 
relief in aid of the legal action or during its pendency." This 
long-standing principle of equity dictates that only under the 
most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view 
of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now 
anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost 
through prior determination of equitable claims.'22 
The Court continued this analysis in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. 
Wood,lB where it emphasized that 
[Beacon Theatres], of course, applies whether the trial judge 
chooses to characterize the legal issues presented as "inciden- 
tal" to equitable issues or not. Consequently, in a case such as 
this where there cannot even be a contention of such "impera- 
tive circumstances," Beacon Theatres requires that any legal 
issues for which a trial by jury is timely and properly de- 
manded be submitted to a jury.'" 
The Supreme Court in Dairy Queen virtually eliminated the 
possibility for a legal remedy to be recast as an equitable reme- 
dy merely because it is "incidental to or intertwined with" an 
equitable remedy.125 Therefore, front pay cannot be character- 
ized as an equitable remedy simply because it is related to the 
equitable remedy of reinstatement. If front pay is legal in na- 
ture, it remains legal in nature. Of course, this begs the ques- 
tion: Is front pay properly characterized as a legal remedy 
which entitles an ADEA plaintiff to a jury trial? 
120. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U S .  469, 472-73 (1962). 
121. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
122. Id. at 510-11 (quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891)) (empha- 
sis added). 
123. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
124. Id. at 473 (emphasis added). 
125. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE $ 11.5 (1985). 
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V. ADEA FRONT PAY IS A LEGAL REMEDY 
THAT ENTITLES ADEA PARTIES TO A JURY TRIAL 
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial 
as it existed at common law: "In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be pre~erved."'~~ The phrase "suits at 
common law" has been interpreted to mean suits in which legal 
rights are to be adjudicated, "in contradistinction to those 
where equitable rights alone [are] recognized, and equitable 
remedies [are] ad~ninistered."'~' The analysis of "suits at com- 
mon law" also applies to causes of action which are created by 
Congress.lB 
The Supreme Court's two-part test for determining wheth- 
er a statutory action is legal in nature was articulated in Tull 
v. United States:129 
To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to 
cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in 
courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both 
the nature of the action and of the remedy sought. First, we 
compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought 
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of 
law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and 
determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.lgO 
126. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
127. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), quoted in Chauffeurs 
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990). 
128. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). "We recognize, of course, the 
'cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.' " 
Id. at 192 n.6 (quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 
369 (1971)). A determination that the ADEA does not clearly provide for a jury 
trial on the issue of the amount of front pay was made above. See supra part 
1V.B. 
129. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
130. Id. at 417-18. In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), Justice 
White had indicated that a three-part test should be used: "the 'legal' nature of an 
issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to 
such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and 
limitations of juries." 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have eliminated the third part of Justice 
White's test but retained the first two parts. See, e.g.; Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. 
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (unanimously approving the use of only the two- 
part test in this case). 
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The first part of the test focuses on whether there was a 
common law equivalent to the statutory action at hand-an 
ADEA action. A review of common law actions in 1791 reveals 
that there was no proceeding equivalent to an ADEA suit for 
unlawful age discrimination in employ~nent.'~~ The fact that 
an analogous action at law did not exist in 1791 is not disposi- 
tive. The Seventh Amendment "requires trial by jury in actions 
unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves 
rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an 
action at law, rather than in an action in equity or admi- 
ralty."'" Therefore, the outcome of the test is not dictated by 
an "abstruse historical" search for a common law analogue to  
an ADEA action.'33 
The second part of the test is concerned with whether the 
remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature. The Supreme 
Court determined that the nature of the relief sought is more 
important than fmding a precisely analogous common law 
cause of action..la An action for money damages was "the tradi- 
tional form of relief offered in the courts of law."ls5 In fact, 
the Supreme Court has held that "insofar as the complaint re- 
quests a money judgment it presents a claim which is unques- 
tionably legal."136 Of course, front pay is in the form of money 
damages. The fact that front pay is not available under the 
ADEA until the equitable remedy of reinstatement fails should 
not affect the determination that front pay is legal in nature. 
The proposition that juries should be permitted to deter- 
mine the amount of front pay in ADEA proceedings is but- 
tressed by the Supreme Court's discussion in Beacon Theatres 
v. West~ver.'~' In that case, the Court emphasized the impor- 
tance of the right to a jury trial, stating that "[mlaintenance of 
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occu- 
131. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 114, $ 38.11[5] (listing actions formerly at  
law); id. 8 38.11(61 (listing actions formerly in equity). But see Kolb v. Goldring, 
Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-72 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Rogers v. Exxon Research & 
Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1977)) (ADEA action is identical to a com- 
mon law suit for back wages). 
132. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974). 
133. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 
396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)). 
134. Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)). 
135. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974). 
136. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962). 
137. 359 US. 500 (1959). 
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pies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any 
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scru- 
tinized with the utmost care."ls8 Furthermore, the Court said 
that the right to a jury trial cannot be assailed except "under 
the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in 
view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot 
now anti~ipate."'~~ 
A final obstacle to allowing juries to determine the amount 
of ADEA front pay has been suggested. The Fourth Circuit 
opined that the determination of the amount of front pay is too 
difficult a question for juries to handle.'" Another court rea- 
soned that "if the jury is given the issue, it will be called upon 
to define a frozen image from fluid  circumstance^."'^^ Admit- 
tedly, the determination of the amount of front pay is difficult 
and involves some impre~ision.'~~ However, determining the 
amount of front pay to award an ADEA plaintiff is no more 
difficult or speculative than determining the amount of an 
award for personal injury, a determination routinely made by 
juries. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ADEA provides for reinstatement of workers 
wrongfUlly discharged on the basis of age. Since reinstatement 
of wrongfully discharged employees is sometimes impossible or 
impracticable, courts have awarded front pay in lieu of rein- 
statement in an attempt to "make whole" victims of age dis- 
crimination. 
The federal courts of appeal agree that the decision of 
whether to award front pay in lieu of reinstatement is within 
the discretion of the trial court. The circuits split, however, 
over whether the determination of the amount of front pay is 
within the discretion of the trial judge or the jury. A majority 
of the circuits hold that judges should make the determination. 
The Seventh Amendment, however, indicates that the right 
to a jury trial in legal matters is to be preserved. Because the 
138. Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). 
139. Id. at 510-11. 
140. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 429 (1991). 
141. Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 725 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Md. 1989). 
142. Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 772 n.11 (3d Cir. 1989). 
143. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1057 (1986). 
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Supreme Court's decisions indicate that front pay is properly 
characterized as a legal remedy, ADEA claimants should be 
permitted to  have juries determine the amount of front pay in 
ADEA proceedings. 
B. Todd Bailey 
